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Much of the study of economic growth has to be about the structure of models, so that we 
understand the mechanics of growth and the proximate causes of income differences. But part 
of this broad study must also confront the fundamental causes of economic growth, which 
relate  to  policies,  institutions,  and  other  factors  that  lead  to  different  investment, 
accumulation, and other decisions. (Acemoglu 2009, p.140.)  
 
1.  Introduction (or ‘Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste’).   
The current economic crisis has taught another generation of Australians that their economy 
remains vulnerable to negative external shocks, as it has been since the depression of the 
early 1840s. So it is unsurprising that shocks and crises figure prominently in the economic 
history literature, with most attention given the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s. Less 
attention has been given to other negative shocks, or to a comparative treatment of shocks. In 
particular, the implications for long-run prosperity resulting from the policy  responses to 
shocks have not received the scrutiny given their short run consequences.  
That policy shifts induced by a crisis can have long-run effects on growth is illustrated 
by  recent  experience.  The  policy  „reforms‟  of  the  1980s  were  largely  a  response  to  the 
negative shocks of the 1970s, but introduced also in the belief that growth in the longer run 
would be enhanced. Indeed, the ensuing period of prosperity (1991-2008) has been adduced 
in support of the success of the earlier policy changes. An additional feature of the policy 
reforms of the 1980s is that they were accompanied by – or required – significant changes to 
some of the key institutional arrangements within which the economy functioned. This close 
association between policy shifts and changes to institutions in response to a major economic 
shock may be observed also in earlier periods in Australian history. The joint attention given 
in  this  paper  to  major  institutional  and  policy  changes  thus  derives  from  the  difficulty 
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encountered in clearly separating them, whether in their timing, in the motivation behind 
them, or with respect to their effects on growth.  
  It is suggested that major shocks have been a principal source of those changes in 
institutional arrangements and policies of most relevance to long-run growth since the late 
nineteenth  century.  Of  course, incremental  institutional change and adjustments  to policy 
settings  are  continuous.  But  Australian  experience  may  be  better  characterised  as  one  in 
which periods of relatively modest change are punctuated by negative shocks which lead to a 
clustering of more significant changes.  
The institutional and policy changes discussed will not occasion surprise – they are 
those accorded most attention in historical accounts of the determinants of the economy‟s 
performance.  However  I  question  the  prominence  given  in  the  literature  to  the  1890s 
depression  as  a  watershed  event  significantly  determining  the  course  of  institutional  and 
policy  changes  until  the  1970s.  Rather,  attention  is  drawn  to  the  significance  of  major 
intervening shocks and the responses to them. For example, the responses to the two wars, to 
unfavourable conditions in the world economy in the 1920s, and to the depression of the 
1930s  are here seen as  largely independent  events,  not  simply  a sequence of predictable 
choices reinforcing and refining a pre-determined institutional and policy regime (or growth 
strategy)  which  had  emerged  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1890s  depression.  This  alternative 
perspective  seems  consistent  with  the  timing  of  key  institutional  and  policy  changes, 
especially  where  emphasis  is  given  to  their  economic  impact  rather  than  the  dates  of 
landmark  pieces  of  legislation.
2  It also appears to accord better w ith the evidence when 
attempting to identify the effects of the institutional and policy changes on long-run growth 
and prosperity.   
This is a brief and speculative excursion into a lar ge topic, leaving key questions 
unexamined. In any attempt to account more fully for particular responses to major shocks it 
would be necessary to consider   the roles of expectations, social norms, and the state of 
economic theory, as well as the political context. A more thorough inquiry into the Australian 
historical experience would  also better identify the mechanisms linking shocks with policy 
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responses and institutional change. And more attention would be accorded the responses to 
positive shocks, whereas negative shocks dominate the discussion here.  
    
2.  Literature. 
In  recent  years  economists  have  assigned  greater  prominence  to  institutions  in  their 
explanations for why some countries are rich and others poor.
3 In part this reflects the search 
for a „deeper‟ or more „fundamental‟ explanation for growth than that obtainable if attention 
is  confined  to  the  „proximate‟  influences  identified  as  relevant  by  most  (parsimonious) 
theories of growth, such as those emphasising the roles of physical and human capital. In 
addition,  regression  analyses  of  newly-available  cross-country  data-sets  have  highlighted 
many  correlates  of  growth  not  previously  given  attention  in  growth  models,  including  a 
number  of  proxy  measures  for  institutions,  stimulating  in  turn  fresh  questions  about  the 
causal relationships at work.  
  In  the  analysis  of  the  role  of  institutions  in  growth,  one  question  attracting 
considerable attention is the extent to which some institutions exhibit persistence over very 
long periods. If institutions both matter for growth and are persistent, then the explanation of 
why economies acquire growth-enhancing as against growth-retarding institutions may lead 
far back into their history.
4 In the most prominent of the attempts to link the variation in 
current levels of economic prosperity across countries with institutional determinants, the 
historical experience of ex-colonies of the European imperial powers has been scrutinised. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) argue that some key features associated with 
the initial occupation of an economy by the Europeans led to differences in the institutional 
legacy of colonialism and, in turn,   the differences currently observed in  their  per capita 
income  levels.
5  These  foundational  institutional  arrangements  thus  exhibit  remarkable 
persistence in their influence on economic performance  after a century or more ,  lending 
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importance  both  to  the  role of historical  influences in  accounting  for  differential  income 
levels today, and to the question of how the choices between alternative institutions were 
made.   
But not all institutions exhibit such persistence. Many undergo change (modification, 
adaptation) of greater or lesser moment. Some disappear. And from time to time there are 
institutional  innovations. To cite a  local  example from the  constitutional  sphere,  yet  one 
having obvious economic implications, New South Wales began the European phase of its 
history (in 1788) as a British military enterprise, but evolved into an autocracy under the 
formal rule of the British, then (between the 1820s and 1840s) acquired some elements of 
representative  government  and  democracy,  later  (in  the  1850s)  securing  responsible 
government and substantial independence from the imperial government, before federating 
(in 1901) with other colonies under a constitution that contained elements of both the British 
and  American  models.  In  such  circumstances  it  is  not  sufficient  to  posit  a  set  of  initial 
conditions that determine the institutional context which is then locked in. Economists have 
therefore begun to explore more closely both the sources of institutional change and how they 
relate to growth.
6  
The term „institution‟ is not always consistently applied in this literature. In different 
contexts  it  may refer to political  arrangements, constitutional designs,  product  and factor 
market structures, the legal system, organisational forms at a micro level, and more. Hence 
what should be classified as an institutional feature of an economy rather than something 
closely related is not always clear. One issue is whether informal „rules‟ or social norms are 
part of those institutional „arrangements‟ which are critical to growth outcomes.
7 Another, of 
particular  relevance  to  this  paper ,  is  the  blurred  boundary  existing  between  (some) 
institutions and (some) policies. A strict separation of the two may not always be possible, 
especially when considering their impact on growth over the long ru n. I hope to minimise 
these problems of classification by employing conventional usage depending on the context 
or specific case: hence the choice of sub-title.  
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A separate literature examines the role played by differences in policy responses to 
shocks in the explanation of comparative growth. Some countries appear to be better able 
than others to recover from major negative economic shocks, or to leverage faster growth 
from a positive shock. And where a shock simultaneously impacts many countries (such as in 
a world depression), or where the shock has similar features (as with a debt crisis, or a sudden 
shift in the terms of trade), something of a natural experiment occurs.
8 It is one thing to note 
these differences, and attribute the subsequent variation in growth rates to the differential 
policy responses to the common shock, but what explains the different responses? One view 
is that the quality of institutions of conflict management are critical in determining whether or 
not a negative external shock engenders serious social conflict thus inhibiting the adoption of 
appropriate policy responses. However, in Australia, unlike in many developing economies, 
such institutions have long existed: an independent judiciary, a free press, a democratic form 
of governance, and so on. Another view is that the „resilience‟ or „flexibility‟ of an economy 
(and society) in responding to a major negative shock hinges crucially on social norms and 
the  cultural  context.
9  Again,  in  the  case  of  Australia  these  may  have  been  relatively 
favourable from the outset and not have changed greatly over time. Regrettably absent from 
these cross-country explorations of the consequences for growth of the policy responses to 
shocks is a clear delineation of the mechanisms at work.  
Before  drawing  on  suggestions  in  this  growth  literature  to  review  aspects  of  the 
Australian experience since the 1890s, it is necessary to summarise what appears a widely 
accepted interpretation of the growth strategies which were adopted. What may be designated 
the  „conventional‟  view  is  that  the  history  of  development  policies  since  the  nineteenth 
century, and the key institutional arrangements associated with them, falls into three phases. 
We  might  label  these  as  three  successive  institutional  and  policy  „regimes‟  aimed  at 
promoting long-run growth. In the first, running to the 1890s, the economy was extremely 
open to labour and capital inflows as well as to trade, and subject to only modest levels of 
domestic  market  regulation.  But  governments  played  a  prominent  role  in  promoting 
economic growth by assisting immigration, borrowing in London to finance infrastructure, 
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and encouraging rural settlement and the expansion of the export-oriented rural industries in 
recognition of their vital role in the economic prosperity of the times.  
The multiple crises of the 1890s brought this first phase to an end. Indeed the shocks 
resulting  from  a  domestic  financial  crisis,  a  foreign  debt  crisis,  asset  price  declines,  and 
persisting serious drought all combined, in this view, to lay the foundations for a long period 
in which the growth strategy was fundamentally different, and major new institutions were 
created. Federation was the most obvious institutional response, and there followed quickly 
the implementation of new restrictions on immigration, the first federal hike in the tariff, and 
the first decisions in the federal sphere towards a more regulated labour market. These moves 
were related, and dubbed the „new protection‟ or more recently the „Australian settlement‟. 
Together they formed the (coherent, consistent) development strategy whose essentials were 
not to change for about 70 years. In this view of institutional and policy history (at least as it 
relates to long-run growth), the strategy subsequently was extended or reinforced but not 
fundamentally departed from. But as a result of the adoption of this inward-oriented and 
relatively highly regulated regime, growth was retarded, an outcome increasingly recognised 
in the post-war decades.  
In  this  interpretation  the  negative  impact  of  the  economic  shocks  of  the  1970s 
demonstrated that a „wrong turn‟ had been taken at the beginning of the century. The reversal 
in  growth  strategy  in  the  1980s  included  de-regulation  in  banking  and  transportation, 
privatisation of government enterprises, lowering of tariff levels, entry of foreign retail banks, 
and the floating of the exchange rate. Later there followed taxation reforms and a partial de-
regulation of the labour market. The economy became, once again, outward oriented and less 
tightly regulated, thus entering the third act in this 150-year long drama.
10   
 It  is  suggested   here  that  this  interpretation  warrants  reconsideration;  that  the 
consequences for growth of the policy responses and institutional changes arising  from the 
crisis of the 1890s have been overstated; that there were recurring short periods throughout 
the 20
th  century  of  concentrated  institutional  and  policy  changes  of  comparable  or  even 
greater importance to growth than those at the turn of the century; and that these changes in 
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the institutional  and policy  regimes  were the result of  a succession of  (mainly)  negative 
shocks beginning with the First World War.  
3.    Nineteenth  Century  Background.  To  fully  account  for  the  role  of  institutions  in 
Australia‟s long-run growth, it is important to recall that the institutional changes during the 
20
th century occurred alongside other persisting (foundation) institutions dating from the 19
th 
century  such as  language,  the legal  system,  and constitutional and political  arrangements 
(culminating in  Federation). These institutions were either imported  then subject  to  local 
adaptation, or were local innovations. Indeed there has perhaps been rather more persistence 
in these „deep‟ institutional arrangements than in other settler economies. For example, there 
was  no  challenge  to  the  national  language  policy  (unlike  Canada),  no  disruptions  to 
continuous constitutional rule (as in Argentina), no civil war (as in the United States), and the 
colonies were not abolished (as occurred with New Zealand‟s provincial governments) but 
became states in a federal system.  
  I  have  elsewhere  explored  the  role  of  initial  endowments  in  accounting  for  the 
emergence of some foundational institutions (McLean 2007b), as these exogenous conditions 
have been assigned a pivotal role in an influential comparative analysis of long-run economic 
performance in the Americas.
11 However, there is no evidence in the history of the Australian 
colonies that early institutional lock-in resulted from the set of endowments at the time of 
European settlement. Rather, there appears to have been a more complex interplay between 
these conditions and the major actors in the early phases of institution-making.
12 And, unlike 
the standard political economy model where a property owning elite is pitted against a large 
property-less class, the direction of institutional innovation in the Au stralian colonies was 
also heavily influenced by a third actor, the British government (or the Governor, or colonial 
office officials).
13 Far from observing rigidity in the early political and economic institutions 
(as is frequently claimed to be the case i n Argentina, for example), the Australians ended 
convict transportation and the importation of indentured Melanesian labour, gradually wound 
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back the political power of the squatter class, and re-allocated (at least a portion of) the public 
lands initially granted in large holdings to relatively few occupiers.  
  In addition, the Australian literature contains many examples of the economic analysis 
of  other  19
th  century  institutional  changes  relevant  to  the  explanation  of  growth  in  the 
colonies. These include such diverse topics as adaptation within the early legal system, the 
institutional  innovation  known  as  the  stock  and  station  agency  system,  the  evolution  of 
property rights in alluvial gold mining, and the establishment of public sector agricultural 
research  and  education  institutions.
14  These  were  parts  of  a  continuously   evolving 
institutional framework within which Australian growth was sustained across many decades, 
a golden era that was also remarkably free of major negative shocks.  
4.  Institutional and Policy Responses to Shocks: An Analytical Narrative:  
For the present exercise it is important to identify any lag between the conventional dating of 
an institutional or policy change on the one hand, and on the other the time when it gets 
implemented (modified, expanded, etc) such as to have an effect on growth. In this regard it 
may be helpful to note some similarities with the economic analysis of technological change. 
Invention, innovation, and diffusion (adoption) are the stages conventionally distinguished in 
the  development  of  a  new  process  or  product.  Historians  of  science  and  technology 
emphasise invention – the discovery date, or date of a patent or crucial experiment. But its 
economic significance begins only at the time of its first commercial application and depends 
on  the  rate  (and  extent)  of  its  subsequent  diffusion.  An  analogous  situation  arises  with 
institutional changes. To frame their story, historians tend to focus on key dates, such as 
when the first (or a benchmark) piece of legislation in a given area was enacted, and this 
status frequently is assigned from a political or constitutional perspective. Federation has a 
precise  date,  but  when  does  this  institutional  change  have  a  significant  impact  on  the 
economy?  Immigration  restrictions  are  introduced  in  an  act  of  the  Commonwealth 
parliament, but when do they significantly impact the level or composition of Australia‟s 
immigration? Tariff schedules are altered at various times that are clearly identified, but their 
economic impact may be long delayed or offset by other factors.  If all institutional and 
policy changes had immediate and full impact from the date of their enactment, and were 
never subsequently modified or adapted, this issue would not arise. But this is likely to be as 
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rare as is the case of new knowledge or technology being fully diffused in the marketplace 
without any lag following its invention or discovery. And closer inspection of the record 
suggests that, as in the case of technological change, the most significant institutional and 
policy  changes  from  an  economic  perspective  often  occur  as  later  modifications  or 
adaptations to the original or landmark legislation, regulation, or policy announcement.  
As  noted,  there  exists  a  considerable  measure  of  agreement  as  to  which  broad 
institutional and policy changes since the 1890s have had the greatest impact on Australian 
growth. These are Federation and changes  directly flowing from  it (such as  federal-state 
financial  arrangements  and  the  expansion  of  the  role  in  the  economy  of  the  federal 
government), those relating to the labour market (including immigration), and those relating 
to external trade policy (especially tariff protection of manufacturing). Since the aim in this 
paper is to suggest a reconsideration of the role of shocks in accounting for the origin (and 
hence growth effects) of only the major changes in institutional arrangements, or the most 
significant of the shifts in the direction of policies bearing on long-run growth, the selection 
is  intended  to  be  illustrative  not  comprehensive.  Thus  other  important  changes  to  the 
institutional  framework  within  which  the  Australian  economy  operated  will  largely  be 
ignored, such as those relating to capital markets (including the central bank) and other key 
domestic industries and markets (agriculture, transport, etc.). For similar reasons, and because 
the focus here is on the long run, I ignore those shifts in macroeconomic policies having 
primarily a short-run focus and effects.  
The 1890s depression: The severity and duration of the economic depression of the 1890s, 
which was comparable in both dimensions to the depression of the 1930s, led either directly 
or indirectly to major changes in some institutions and policies as well as to expectations and 
social norms. The principal institutional and policy changes listed in the standard accounts as 
responses to the depression are Federation and some key legislative landmarks during the 
early  federal  period.  These  include  the  restrictions  on  immigration  (aimed  partly  at 
Melanesian labour); the establishment of new federal industrial relations institutions and their 
early  decisions  (Harvester);  and  the  harmonisation  of  tariff  levels  which  accompanied 
Federation together with their increase in 1908 (the Lyne tariff).  
  It is likely that the short and medium term effects on economic prosperity of all these 
changes were slight. This includes any effects of the introduction of a common external tariff 10 
 
at  a  rate  above  that  applying  in  some  of  the  colonies  (Forster  1977).  The  most  recent 
estimates of the average rates of tariff protection do not show any increase during this period 
(Lloyd 2008). In the labour market, important institutional innovations were made in the area 
of industrial dispute resolution and key decisions regarding minimum wages were announced 
within  the  new  regulatory  regime.  Most  intensively  examined  has  been  the  Harvester 
judgement of 1907, attaining considerable status in the history of industrial relations and 
wage determination in Australia. Yet there appears to be no evidence that these institutional 
and policy changes had a measurable effect on the operation of the wider economy prior to 
the war.
15    
It is more difficult to assess the  economic significance of any changes following the 
1890s in social norms (including of fairness) or expectations (including of government in 
providing welfare and economic „security‟ or stabilisation). Yet these are close relatives to 
the institutional and policy changes being considered here. And perhaps it is with respect to 
them that the shock of the 1890s depression and droughts left its most lasting imprint on 
society. Clearly the strikes and unemployment of the 1890s greatly influenced the agenda and 
world  view  of  the  labour  movement  in  its  search  for  improved  working  conditions  and 
economic  security,  a  search  pursued  through  enhanced  political  representation  and  the 
creation of new labour market institutions. Also, given the important role of expectations in 
determining  fluctuations  in  the  level  of  economic  activity,  the  flurry  of  legislation  and 
associated institution building following Federation may of itself have played a confidence-
boosting role in the economy prior to the war.  
  Although new federal institutions were created during the first decade of the twentieth 
century partly in response to events in the preceding decade, the key question here is whether 
New South  Wales, Victoria, or any other colony  would have experienced a  significantly 
different growth path between 1901 and 1914 had Federation not occurred. Constitutional, 
political, and related legal arrangements would all have been different in this counterfactual. 
But within this timeframe neither the level nor distribution of incomes is likely to have been 
greatly affected.  
The First World War (and its aftermath):  That the First World War delivered a sizable 
negative  shock  to  the  economy  is  not  always  appreciated.  The  mobilisation  of  troops 
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contributed  to  a  fall  of  6  percent  in  total  civilian  employment  between  1914  and  1918. 
Aggregate real GDP declined by 9.5 percent between 1914 and 1920 before recovery set in. 
And because of population growth, per capita GDP fell more sharply, by 16 percent between 
1914 and 1918. Had this occurred in peacetime, it would be classified as a depression. Other 
economic indicators of the impact of the war include the disruption to the labour market, the 
extension  of  government  controls,  the  plunge  in  international  trade,  and  the  growth  in 
domestic  manufacturing  due  partly  to  wartime  demands  but  more  from  the  need  to  find 
domestic sources for previously imported goods. Given the severity of this shock, it is not 
surprising that there were significant consequences for the evolution of the institutions and 
policies we are tracing.  
  The „natural‟ protection afforded by wartime interruptions to international shipping 
encouraged the expansion of domestic production of import substitutes, an expansion that 
proved vulnerable to lower-cost import competition with the return of more normal trading 
conditions following the war. The political economy context of the Greene tariff (1921) is 
thus fairly clear. These war-infant firms faced a short life expectancy unless they received 
some measure of protection from imports. In the view of some commentators, the resulting 
hike  in  some  tariffs  marks  the  true  origins  of  a  significant  protectionist  trend  towards 
Australian manufacturing. And the particular adjustments made may have been effective in 
sustaining activity in respect to the targeted goods and their producers such that the war led 
directly to the change in the incidence of tariff protection. But the average level of the tariff 
does not appear to have risen at this time (Lloyd 2008). And the overall level of protection to 
manufacturers may have been little changed as any tariff rises were offset by changes in 
transport and other costs (Pope 1986).  
  There were also important war-related changes to the labour market regime in the 
early 1920s. The wartime inflation, and declines in real wages as money wages failed to keep 
pace, are part of a complex background to important decisions on the basic wage, such as an 
increase in its level and the introduction of automatic cost of living adjustments in 1922. The 
economic consequences of these changes to the labour market regime, unlike those made pre-
war, are agreed to have been non-trivial. Most assessments focus on distributional issues 
arising from the changes, and regard them as benign or desirable. Their implications for 
growth,  however,  were  likely  deleterious.  Given  the  deteriorating  international  trading 
environment Australia faced in the early 1920s, a mandated increase in real wages (or real 12 
 
unit  labour  costs)  was  not  conducive  to  securing  productivity  gains,  encouraging 
employment, or improving international competitiveness.
16   
  These two examples of institutional and policy responses to the war occurred at the 
federal level: they concerned federal institutions and policies. In a formal sense, they would 
not have arisen had no federal   government existed, and it has been acknowledged   that 
Federation was in part a response to the earlier shock of the 1890s depression. However, it 
was the war that led to these changes in institutions and policies in the 1920s which resulted 
in them having  for the first time a significant   impact on the economy. These pos t-war 
changes were not simply an inevitable response to the earlier slump somehow lagged by three 
decades. One needs only to consider a no-war counterfactual to get some perspective on this. 
There would have been no infant firms conceived under war-time circumstances mewling for 
protection as their  survival was threatened by the return to peacetime international trading 
conditions. And there would have been no convulsion s in the labour market to match the 
impact of war-time mobilisation,  nor the inflationar y  conditions that  resulted from the 
conversion to a war economy.  
  During the 1920s there are other important institutional and policy changes that were, 
indirectly, responses to the shock to the economy delivered by the war and its immediate 
aftermath. One is the creation of the Loan Council, an effort to better co-ordinate the overseas 
borrowing efforts of the states and Commonwealth governments. The context of this included 
the war loans that had been raised in London and the resulting debt-servicing burden. It also 
included  a  much weakened  and  straitened  international  capital  market  compared  to  its 
condition pre-war. The war had brought to an end the first period of globalisation in 
international finance, and Australia was vulnerable to the deterioration   in the conditions 
facing debtor nations.  
  Another consequence of the war was   oversupply in  the  international markets for 
agricultural commodities. The disruption to trade during the war had  directly encouraged 
increased  production,  especially  in  th e  U.S.,  and  this  additional   capacity  was  a  factor 
depressing prices in the 1920s. An indirect result of the war was that the newly-created states 
in Europe adopted a policy of stimulating agricultural output as one of the few avenues 
available to earn scarce foreign exchange. The war had thus bequeathed to the 1920s serious 
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imbalances  in  agricultural  markets,  and  Australian  farmers‟  prosperity  was  vulnerable  to 
these. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the 1920s witnessed a proliferation in 
various forms of agricultural assistance, subsidy, and support schemes. Some involved the 
creation of new institutions – such as state marketing boards. The war had resulted in the 
disintegration of the well-functioning global trading system,  and in response there  was a 
marked change in the institutional regime within which Australian farmers produced and 
marketed their products.  
  There is an additional feature of the 1920s of interest here as it constitutes evidence 
that the pre-1890 outward-oriented growth strategy had not by then been superseded with 
some  full-blown  inward-oriented  alternative.  The  clutch  of  policies  promoting  assisted 
Empire  migration,  sub-dividing  farms  for  closer  settlement,  extending  rural  branch-line 
railways, encouraging soldier-settler farming schemes, cross-subsidising rural areas within 
the  PMG,  and  more,  all  point  to  the  continued  primacy  of  the  view  that  the  critical 
bottlenecks  facing  Australia‟s  development  were  its  need  for  more  people  and  a  greater 
capacity to import. Rural development and the expansion of agricultural exports remained the 
principal route to this, albeit amid rising concern that the rural sector would be unable to 
create  significant  additional  employment  opportunities.  The  Development  and  Migration 
Commission is an institutional embodiment of this policy, and of its survival into the interwar 
period. Of course, these policies have been excoriated in later evaluations by economists and 
economic historians as resulting in wasted public investment and regulatory inefficiencies. 
But  here  our  aim  is  to  identify  the  timing  and  determinants  of  changes  in  institutional 
arrangements and policies affecting growth.  
The depression of the 1930s:  This further external shock began before 1929, with aggregate 
real  GDP  peaking  in  1926-27.  The  downturn  accelerated  thereafter  as  the  post-war 
international economy collapsed, trade volumes plummeted and capital markets froze. Given 
the focus adopted here, what were the key institutional and policy responses to the shock of 
the  1930s  depression  of  greatest  importance  for  long-run  growth?  First,  there  was  a 
significant boost to tariff protection for manufacturing. The available data suggest that the 
Scullin  tariff  (1930) lifted protection by amounts  that leave the earlier increases  in  rates 
looking  modest  (Lloyd  2008).  More  sophisticated  measures  may  be  lacking,  but  we  can 
conclude  that  during  the  1930s  import-competing  firms  were  afforded  increased  shelter. 
There occurred some increase across the depression decade in manufacturing as a share of 14 
 
both GDP and employment, but there is debate about the contributions to this outcome of the 
increased tariffs and of the devaluation in the exchange rate (Thomas 1988).  
  The devaluation against sterling was part of the policy response to the crisis and is 
generally viewed in terms of its short-run contribution to recovery (Eichengreen 1988). But 
the choice of exchange rate regime, or maintenance of an inappropriate rate, can also have 
long-run implications for growth. Unlike in the 1890s depression, when leaving the gold-
sterling standard was apparently not seriously considered, the historic devaluation of 1931 
marks an important regime switch. However, the short-run effects of this and other policy 
responses have been shown to have probably been of limited effect: the government had few 
policy tools available and, given its level of foreign indebtedness and dependence on foreign 
capital, was constrained in their use, having to await the return of more buoyant conditions in 
the  international  economy  for  a  full  and  sustained  recovery  (Valentine  1987;  Siriwadana 
1995).  
The Pacific war:  The First World War, the problems in the international economy in the 
1920s, and the world slump of the early 1930s were all unambiguously negative shocks for 
the Australian economy. The economic impact of the Second World War was more complex. 
It  was  disruptive  to  the  domestic  civilian  economy  on  a  scale  greater  than  that  of  its 
predecessor.  But  the  disruption  on  this  occasion  was  by  no  means  so  overwhelmingly 
negative. Australia leveraged impressive growth from its conversion to a wartime economy 
with real GDP increasing by a staggering 41 percent over the four years after 1938-39 to its 
(unsustainable)  peak  in  1942-43.  However,  this  measure  of  output  expansion  should  be 
viewed alongside the trend in real private consumption, which declined by 15 percent from 
1938-39 to its trough in 1943-44. Clearly there was a much greater diversion of resources into 
war-related  production  than  in  the  First  World  War,  sustaining  output  growth  and 
employment despite the expansion of numbers in the military. Why were the effects on the 
economy  of  the  shock  arising  from  this  war  so  different?  Part  of  the  explanation  is  of 
relevance to our examination of how institutions and policies change in response to shocks.  
  The first  point to  note is  that the capacity of the Australian economy  to  produce 
military equipment, munitions and other supplies in 1939 was greatly enhanced as a result of 
the expansion and especially the diversification of the manufacturing sector after 1914. Steel, 
chemicals, metal smelting, electrical goods, and car components are just some of the products 15 
 
domestically manufactured by the end of the 1930s. Both productive capacity and the skills 
of the workforce were greatly enhanced compared to what had been available for conversion 
to wartime purposes in 1914. Of course, this expanded capacity resulted to some degree from 
the protection afforded particular industries and producers during the interwar period. How 
differently placed Australia would have been at this critical point in its history under the 
assumption of a post-Federation free-trade regime is an important (counterfactual) question 
which has not yet been addressed.  
  There is also a demand-side difference to the domestic economic impacts of the two 
wars. This is especially clear if attention is focused on the war in the Pacific, as the war came 
to  Australia‟s  doorstep  also  in  the  economic  sense.  Long  supply  lines  had  limited  the 
contribution  in  materiel  Australia  could  make  when  the  principal  theatre  of  war  was  in 
Europe, whether between 1914 and 1918 or in 1939. After Pearl Harbor Australia‟s military-
industrial capacity was ideally located to support the war effort in the South-West Pacific. 
The division of labour that emerged between American and Australian sources of supply after 
1942, involving a partial demobilisation of Australian forces to increase the production of 
war materiel, is an illustration of this.  
In this context, the policy responses and institutional changes made under the threat of 
potential invasion were dramatic. Government planning and regulation extended in detail into 
the labour market, food production, and most of manufacturing, and to controls on many 
prices. The uniform income tax agreement with the states permanently changed the revenue 
balance within the Commonwealth. Domestic savings were mobilised through war bonds. 
And there was more.  
  As our focus is on the institutional and policy changes of importance to growth rather 
than the management of war, the question is what significance for post-war growth lies in 
these wartime events. One is that the war gave industrialisation its biggest boost, with the 
1940s  recording  a  larger  increase  than  any  other  decade.  The  share  of  employment  in 
manufacturing rose from 23 to 29 percent of total employment (between 1939 and 1949), 
while its share in GDP rose from 18.5 to 26.2 percent.
17 There had also occurred a deepening 
of the skills base and a rise in relative labour productivity in the sector. There  was little 
                                                           
17  To put this wartime increase in historical perspective, the share of manufacturing in GDP was 12.1 percent 
in 1901, and rose only to 16.7 percent in 1929.  16 
 
further  increase  in  these  shares,  which  were  maintained  to  the  1970s.  Thus  it  was  the 
response to the war in the Pacific that directly bequeathed the greatly expanded industrial 
sector, while the increases in tariff protection over the previous four decades played only an 
indirect role.  
  Many of the other institutional and policy legacies of the war that impinged on post-
war  growth  are  familiar,  running  from  the  growth  in  government  micro-regulation  and 
macro-management of the economy, through the extended range of social welfare programs. 
There was also a set of expectations regarding work and thrift, forged in the experience of the 
depression  and  war,  which  probably  contributed  importantly  to  sustaining  the  post-war 
prosperity. A contrast with the previous war was the opportunity to pay down the foreign 
war-related financial obligations (due to the unwinding of Lend-Lease arrangements) thus 
removing the debt overhang which had been such a burden in the 1920s and beyond.  
The end of the post-war boom: The reasons for the long post-war boom in the international 
economy  are  well  understood,  as  are  the  reasons  for  Australia  sharing  in  the  prosperity. 
However, it is worth noting that this period was not without some significant shocks to the 
Australian economy. The Korean War wool boom and the associated terms of trade shock in 
the early 1950s were, of course, positive in their initial impact. Being positive rather than 
negative, this shock did not challenge the existing institutional and policy regimes, with the 
possible exception of the ending of wage indexation to prevent locking in the effects of a 
temporary spike in inflation. Perhaps this episode serves to illustrate the asymmetric effect of 
positive  and  negative  shocks  on  institutions  and  policy  settings.  Indeed,  institutions  and 
policies that are growth-retarding are more likely to survive under boom conditions. The 
1950s and 1960s are thus not a period of major institutional innovation, nor is there any 
significant change in growth strategy.  
  A second shock, evident by the late 1960s, had a more ambiguous impact. This was 
the first of the succession of resource „booms‟ that have since made a large contribution to 
the country‟s prosperity. The supply-side shock from  the minerals  boom  may have been 
beneficial to some industries and regions, but was soon understood to be placing serious 
strains on others, as illuminated by the booming sector analysis developed at the time. And it 
is  in  this  new  context  that  some  key  existing  policy  settings,  and  the  institutions  that 
supported them, came increasingly to be regarded as inhibiting rather than enhancing growth. 17 
 
Looking back, the minerals boom of the 1960s can be seen as the harbinger of broader shifts 
in the international economy (especially the low skill-intensive industrialisation underway in 
resource-poor economies in East Asia). The growth strategy and associated institutional and 
policy regime that had been sustainable throughout the post-war period, indeed appeared to 
be the source of much of its prosperity, was now coming under challenge.  
  The oil price rise, collapse of Bretton Woods, world trade liberalisation, and spread of 
higher inflation in the early 1970s heralded another bout of (mainly) negative shocks to the 
Australian economy. This  story is  familiar, as  are the responses  thereto, including major 
changes to policies and institutions. But to conclude this „narrative‟ section, two observations 
seem pertinent. First, advocates of the policy and institutional „reform‟ agenda in and after 
the 1970s employed arguments based on economic theory, on the evidence of a (putative) 
relative decline in growth rates, on ideology, and on history. The last-mentioned took the 
form of the „wrong turn‟ interpretation of Australian economic history. It emphasised what I 
earlier  described  as  the  conventional  or  orthodox  interpretation  of  the  change  in  growth 
strategy from outward- to inward-orientation following the shock of the 1890s depression, 
and emerging in the first years of Federation in related policy responses and institutional 
innovations  with  respect  to  protection,  immigration,  and  wage  determination.  As  argued 
above, this interpretation seems in need of qualification, and on several grounds.
18 A more 
nuanced reading of the historical evidence would hav e produced a less sweeping arc to the 
narrative, eschewed a thesis of Federation-era institutional and policy lock-in, and given more 
weight to the succession of major negative shocks between 1914 and 1945 as independent  
agents of change.  
The second observation concerns the provisional nature of assessments of the wisdom 
of policy and institutional changes surveyed here, including the cluster associated with the 
Hawke-Keating  government  in  the  1980s.  More  evidence  accumulates;  there  are 
developments in relevant branches of economic theory; and, not least in importance, there are 
further negative shocks that shift the ground on which the observer of history stands. Hence it 
will be no surprise if the current  economic crisis – which may already have influenced this 
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writer‟s perspective – leads to some fresh insight into the significance of the outward re-
orientation and microeconomic reforms that followed the shocks in the 1970s.  
 
5.  Brief Digression: What were the Mechanisms?   
One direction which this inquiry might logically take at this point would be to identify the 
mechanisms  linking  the  shocks  to  the  responses.  In  a  sense  we  know  a  lot  about  these, 
perhaps informally and descriptively. But I‟m not going to pursue this further here, instead 
briefly noting some of the questions to pose and some hints from the literature about how to 
address them, before turning to a discussion of the effects on long-run growth. The questions 
of interest include the following. What determined whether a shock reinforced or undermined 
existing institutions and policies? In particular, are there asymmetric effects of positive and 
negative  shocks?  What  were  the  mechanisms  linking  these  shocks  to  any  changes  in 
institutions and policies? And, what appears to have determined whether the policy responses 
and  institutional  changes  that  were  made  following  a  shock  were  growth-enhancing  or 
growth-retarding in those cases when, ex post, they had a major impact?    
  The  comparative  studies  of  responses  to  shocks,  referred  to  earlier,  essentially 
examine correlations among country-level characteristics to arrive at suggestions about those 
associated with the choice of growth-promoting policies. The mechanisms are not identified. 
In the literature on the political economy of growth, however, a variety of models has been 
developed to  help  identify the conditions  that are likely to  matter in  the choice between 
institutional arrangements and policies that will or will not enhance long-run growth. These 
include endowments (variously defined), the distribution of income or wealth, the openness 
of the economy, whether the polity is democratic or non-democratic, and some key features 
of the constitution.
19 This literature is especially rich in suggestive hypotheses and research 
designs of relevance to historical inquiry, which I have drawn on elsewhere (McLean 2007b). 
And both the writings o n the responses to shocks and those adopting a  political economy 
approach include some attention to wider cultural attributes  –  social  norms,  preferences, 
informal rules. The possible relevance of these to the explanation of Australia‟s long-run 
growth  is  well  recognised  wherever  comparisons  are  made  with  Argentina‟s  historical 
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experience.
20 At a finer level of analysis, the mechanisms of likely relevance to the Australian 
story of responding to shocks, institutional change, and policy re -directions are described in 
many economic, historical and political studies. This is especially the case with respect to the 
history of labour market institutions and policies, and to the history of protection.
21     
 
6.  Impact on Growth of the Institutional and Policy Responses:   
The discussion so far has suggested that the timing of institutional and policy regime changes 
should define the periods within which the effect on growth of a given regime has to be 
uncovered. And any effect on growth likely varied as a result of each change in the regime. It 
has  further  been  suggested  this  approach  may  lead  to  different  conclusions  from  those 
reached in the more conventional bundling of the first 70 years of the 20
th century into a 
single episode, to be assessed as if similar institutions and policies were in force across the 
period with an unchanging degree of application. Here I try to illustrate the implications of 
this alternative perspective by reference to just a few of the more prominent examples of 
institutional and policy regimes thought crucial to long-run growth, drawing on a number of 
the relevant and period-specific assessments available.  
Federation plus: As noted, the consensus in the literature is that Federation and the passage 
of  early  federal  laws  and  establishment  of  associated  institutions  with  respect  to  tariff 
protection, immigration, or wage settlement all had little short-run economic impact. With the 
expanded demands placed on the federal government by the First World War, specifying a 
no-Federation counterfactual becomes very much more difficult, perhaps illustrating that the 
war is  a more important source of institutional and policy change than Federation. Even 
before the depression of the 1930s resulted in a fresh round of demands for expanded federal 
activities, the role of the federal government in economic life was arguably fairly extensive. 
Thus to assess whether Australians have benefitted from Federation it is more manageable to 
examine specific policies adopted, or institutions established, by the federal government. But 
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the question posed here is whether this most prominent of institutional innovations resulted, 
of itself, in enhanced or retarded growth and prosperity.
22  
  Of course, there exists something of a natural experiment on whether the individual 
colonies would have been better of f  economically not to have federated  –  ever.  Seven 
colonies participated in the discussions leading up to federation but one stayed aloof. So the 
New Zealand economic experience since 1901 may help in thinking about the counterfactual 
of a no-federation world. Specifically, to what extent, and within which periods, was growth 
and prosperity in New Zealand some indication of what might have been the experience of at 
least some of the Australian colonies? Until 1960 there is no evidence of per capita GDP in 
New Zealand falling behind that of Australia, although this does not rule out that it may have 
been even higher as the seventh state. Nor does it establish that one or more Australian states 
may  have  diverged  (up  or  down)  from  their  historical  growth  experience  had  they,  too, 
declined to join. After 1970 New Zealand‟s economic performance fell behind Australia‟s, 
despite  increased  economic  integration.  Many  influences  bear  on  the  recent  comparative 
performance  of  the  two  national  economies,  just  as  there  are  well-known  sources  of  the 
changing patterns of growth among the Australian states.
23 Identifying the contribution of 
Federation per se to the observed outcomes may be difficult, but that is the challenge if it is to 
be assigned a key role as an institution underpinning long-run prosperity.  
Protection for manufacturing: In contrast, the implications for growth of the changes to 
trade  policy  that  followed  federation  have  been  more  extensively  investigated.  From  the 
Brigden Report into the tariff, to the inquiries of agencies stretching from the Tariff Board to 
the Productivity Commission, to a considerable academic literature, there is an abundance of 
empirical  evidence  and  analysis  on  whether  the  increased  protection  given  Australian 
manufacturing enhanced or retarded growth. The Bridgen Report was equivocal, noting the 
effects on real wages, income distribution, and on population growth – central social goals at 
the time. It is not clear that any consensus existed among economists prior to the Second 
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political systems it is appropriate to regard Federation of itself as being potentially of considerable significance 
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23  In this context, the relative contribution of natural resource-based activity in Australasia’s regional 
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World War as to whether the tariff had to that time raised or lowered per capita income 
relative to some alternative and freer trade policy regime.  
  Since the 1970s at least, the consensus view has been that by distorting prices and 
misallocating  resources,  the  higher  levels  of  post-war  protection  (tariff  and  non-tariff) 
reduced productivity levels. The policy switch in 1973/1983 ushered in a period of tariff 
reductions, reversing the increases that occurred between Federation and the middle of the 
century. The higher growth rate since 1991 (compared to that in the previous two decades) is 
generally thought to be due in substantial measure to this policy shift.  
  The question posed here is whether there would have occurred higher growth rates in 
earlier decades of the 20
th century had protection remained low (say, no increases on that 
applying at  Federation).  In the course of the policy debates in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
implication was that Australia had taken a welfare- and growth-reducing policy direction 
from the beginning of the century.
24 However, what is needed is an indication of the extent to 
which the  actual  policies  adopted  reduced  growth,  and  whether  that  (putative)  reduction 
varied  over  time  –  prior  to  1914,  during  the  1920s,  during  the  depression,  and  in  the 
immediate  aftermath  of  the  Second  World  War.  What  evidence  exists  suggests  a  more 
nuanced assessment of the impact of the tariff may be in order.  
  Recent  cross-country  historical  analyses  of  tariffs  and  growth  have  raised  the 
possibility that the robustly negative and significant relationship observed in studies of the 
final decades of last century may not be discernible in the evidence for earlier periods.
25 
These analyses, which often include Australia, suggest that the inverse relationship is clearest 
only for the post -war decades (or even since about 1960); that there is no significant 
relationship during the turbulent inter-war period; and that for the period prior to 1914 the 
relationship turns positive and significant.
26  One  possible  explanation  is that the policies 
adopted by one‟s trading partners matter to the benefits obtained from decreased domestic 
protection – perhaps accounting for the inconclusive results for the interwar period. Another 
lies  in  closer  analysis  of  the  sectoral  composition  of  pre-1914  trade,  where  the  positive 
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relationship  between  tariffs  and  growth  may  be  driven  primarily  by  the  evidence  from 
commodity  exporters  (such  as  Australia),  suggesting  that  period-specific  factors  were 
operating then but not after 1945 when manufactured products were more important in world 
trade (Lehmann and O‟Rourke, 2008).  
Was Australia an exception? There are few studies into this question, and the results 
to date are unclear.
27 Yet this line of historical inquiry is of considerable importance to how 
we assess the policy choices made. Also, we should note the conclusion in a recent study that 
the principal reason for relatively low volatility in the Australian economy despite repeated 
commodity terms of trade shocks since 1900 was the increase (to about 1970) in the share of 
the  manufacturing  sector (Bhattacharyya  and  Williamson  2009) .
28  If lower volatility  is 
favourable to long-run growth, this suggests yet another reason why protection for that sector 
may not always have been unambiguously growth-inhibiting. Finally, it has been suggested 
that the role of the tariff in accounting for the increased share of manufactur ing in output to 
1939 may have been less than that of other sources, including changes in consumer demand 
patterns and technological change (Merrett and Ville 2007). Insofar as the negative impact of 
the tariff on productivity and growth was thought to hav e arisen through an inefficient 
allocation of resources into the manufacturing sector,  the importance of  this transmission 
mechanism may have been overstated.  
  Only an interim assessment of the implications of this recent work is possible. What is 
unaffected (to date)  is the orthodox interpretation that Australian growth was increasingly 
retarded (or potentially would have been retarded)  by the high tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
which characterised the post-war era, and that the reduction in protection following the 1970s 
improved  productivity  and  living  standards.  What  is  now  unclear  is  whether  the 
counterfactual of free (or significantly freer) trade in either the interwar or pre -1914 periods 
would have resulted in greater prosperity,  and hence whether the increasingly protectionist 
policies pursued at those times were  significantly growth-retarding or had relatively little 
impact on per capita incomes.  
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Labour market regulation: Similar importance attaches to the historical analysis of the 
effects  of  labour  market  regulation  on  Australian  growth.  For  some  other  countries,  the 
relationship between labour market institutions and productivity performance has been the 
subject of comparative analysis, illustrated by the debate concerning the sources of different 
U.S. and European growth rates and living standards in recent years. But in Australia there 
seems to have been less attention to the evidence about the impact of the choice of labour 
market regime on growth in the long run than has been given its distributional consequences 
and the detailed history of its internal evolution.  
We  have  already  noted  the  assessment  that  any  economic  impact  of  the  post-
Federation changes to labour market institutions was at best modest before the end of the 
First World War, but that changes made in the early 1920s most likely inhibited growth in 
that decade. Discussions of the impact of the labour market regime on the economy during 
the  depression  of  the  1930s  focus  more  on  short-run  distributional  issues,  including  the 
unknown  extent  of  informal  non-compliance  with  legislated  wages  and  conditions.  With 
respect to the recent past, the debates are on-going over whether „mixed‟ regimes resulted in 
inferior  productivity  outcomes  relative  to  either  extreme  of  decentralised  or  highly 
centralised, or indeed over whether there exists any robust relationship between the labour 
market regime and growth.
29 Hence it is perhaps too early to identify with any confidence the 
contribution of labour market reforms   to  recent  changes in  productivity performance  or 
growth, relative to that of influences such as other microeconomic reforms, computerisation, 
globalisation,  and  the  resources  boom.   For  assessments  covering  the  longer  sweep  of 
Australia  history,  there  appears  to  be  some  diffidence  in  c laiming  that  a   strong  and 
empirically-based  relationship  has  been  established  between  a  particular  labour  market 
regime and productivity or growth performance.
30 Perhaps, as has been suggested here, the 
task would be assisted by breaking it down into period s defined by regime changes more 
frequent than that implied by the conventional view of a single regime per sisting through all 
but the final decades of the twentieth century.
31    
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Other institutions and policies: The analysis of the role of shocks in driving institutional 
and policy changes having significant implications for long-run growth could be extended to 
other areas of the economy. For example, given the importance of the financial sector to 
growth, the evolution of capital market institutions and their regulation may also fit a pattern 
of regime change in response to negative shocks. But as indicated earlier, this exploratory 
essay aims to illustrate the argument, not claim to be comprehensive. A different approach 
would entail identifying an institution or policy claimed to have had a significant impact on 
growth and examine its  origins  and evolution,  looking especially for  any role played by 
negative  shocks.  An  example  is  suggested  by  the  provocative  hypothesis  that  the 
development of Australia‟s mineral sector in the post-war period had been delayed for several 
decades by growth-inhibiting regulations and policies.
32    
I will also eschew a review of the attempts to assess the contribution of the reforms of 
the 1980s to growth and productivity since  1991. But in the perspective adopted here these 
efforts are important for at least two reasons. First, they nicely illustrate what is required  by 
way of  careful  empirical analysis in order to assess   the consequences for growth of the 
changes in  institutional and policy regimes  in place  in earlier periods. And second, they 
indicate the challenge posed by such a research agenda, especially for  periods with poorer 
data.  
 
7.  Conclusion.   
It is not a puzzle that many commentators have interpreted aspects of Australia‟s twentieth 
century economic history through a particular lens, where the 1890s depression, strikes, and 
social distress were not just traumatic for the generation who lived through them, but defining 
for the direction taken  by subsequent  generations  of policy makers. Such a lens may be 
appropriate for describing and explaining the internal evolution of particular Federation-era 
institutions  and  policies,  especially  their  legal  and  political  aspects.  But  their  economic 
impact was minimal before 1914. Subsequently they were extensively adapted and modified, 
but  this  occurred primarily in  response to  later shocks.  And it was  only following these 
shocks, and the resulting institutional and policy changes, that we can discern evidence of a 
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significant impact on growth. Of course, none of this diminishes the possibly important role 
the  initial  set  of  Federation-era  institutions  and  policies  may  have  played  in  achieving 
particular  distributional  outcomes,  or  in  moulding  or  reinforcing  certain  social  norms  or 
notions of fairness, then or later. In this respect there could occur a (beneficial) feedback, 
though  any  such  endogenous  mechanism  has  yet  to  be  identified  in  empirical  studies  of 
growth in Australia.  
A  stronger  version  of  the  perspective  offered  here  is  that  the  succession  of 
institutional  and  policy  changes  that  have  been  discussed  did  not  retard  (impede,  lower) 
Australian growth prior to 1939, and that some of these policies better prepared the economy 
to meet the challenges arising from the Pacific War (1941-45). Indeed, the inward-oriented 
phase of growth did not fully kick in until 1940, though the re-direction seems set by 1929. 
Thereafter any growth-retarding consequences were concealed first by war and then by the 
boom that followed. The historically favourable global economic conditions in the immediate 
post-war period would probably have delivered prosperity to Australia under a wide variety 
of  institutional  arrangements  and  policy  settings,  as  is  revealed  by  the  ubiquity  of  high 
(convergence-adjusted)  growth rates during this golden age. Only with the first  post-war 
mineral boom in the 1960s, and the (related) expansion of low-skill and labour-intensive 
industrialisation  in  East  Asia,  did  the  potential  arise  for  key  elements  of  the  existing 
institutional and policy regime to retard growth if they were not modified.   
The current crisis may be the first major „stress test‟ of the wisdom of the changes 
made to institutional arrangements and policy settings dating from the 1980s. The critics of 
outward orientation and of the reduced regulation of markets are re-emerging in the wake of 
the  crisis,  and  there  has  begun  a  reassessment  of  aspects  of  theory  in  finance  and 
macroeconomics. Thus the „test‟ for current institutions and policies arises at the intellectual 
level, in the political sphere, and in terms of popular support – all features of the responses to 
previous major negative shocks to the economy.  
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